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New Zealand’s infrastructure networks are becoming increasingly interconnected 
and dependent on each other for normal operation. While typically studied as 
isolated systems, disruptions can rapidly propagate across networks with 
widespread effects for both society and the economy. It is the nature and 
magnitude of these dependencies which are generally not well understood. 
With interactions between separate networks and a common reliance on electricity 
supply, the wider transportation sector and electricity distribution networks have 
been identified as having major potential as contributors to cascading failures. 
Through a system-of-systems based analysis, this poster presents the dependencies 
between electricity and passenger transportation networks comprising; airports, 
ferries, rail, and petroleum distribution across the State Highway (SH) network. 
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Spatial representations of those selected infrastructures are presented in Fig. 1 as 
separate networks of nodes and edges, i.e. ferry terminals and routes, rail stations 
and tracks, and airports with flight connections. Fuel and electricity networks are 
represented through multi-level hierarchal structures where petrol stations are 
dependent on bulk fuel distribution points via the shortest path routes across the SH 
network of roads and crossings, and lower voltage distribution substations are 
dependent on transmission substations allowing complete network connectivity. 
Further functional dependencies are mapped between electricity dependent 
transportation nodes and edges based on the known or the geographically closest 
substation of an appropriate voltage, thus creating a network-of-networks. 
The criticality of each asset is assumed equivalent to the summed number of users 
directly and indirectly affected by the failure of each network component. Directly 
affected users are assigned according to operator provided counts if made 
available, or where commercially sensitive, estimated using a range of publically 
available statistics, passenger loadings, and the proximity to an asset. Indirectly 
affected users are then determined through inter- and intra-network connections. 
In applying this interdependent network structure, those electricity and passenger 
transportation assets with the greatest disruptive potential to business-as-usual can 
be identified while examining system level dependencies on electricity supply. 
BUILDING NETWORK REPRESENTATIONS 
CRITICAL SUBSTATIONS 
SYSTEM LEVEL DEPENDENCIES 
Disruptions to transportation network users resulting from substation removals are presented in Fig. 3. Through separate exhaustive 
simulations of random ordered transmission and distribution substation failure scenarios, system level dependencies are identified. 
The range and stepping of ferry and air curves are indicative of the comparatively small number of ports compared to substation 
nodes. Similar observations are made for the rail network, where the reliance on two transmission substations for Auckland rail 
electrification ensure the median curve shows an earlier complete rail disruption compared to distribution removals.  
The relatively consistent slopes of the lowest impact fuel supply disruptions suggest petrol stations are well distributed nationally across 
substations. Similarly, the median electricity user disruptions show a reduced range of potential curves with the smallest variation in 
users allocated to both transmission and distribution substations. 
IDENTIFYING VULNERABILITES 
Continuous surfaces are presented in Fig. 2 representing; (i) co-located transportation networks, (ii) areas with the most significant 
disruptive potential for transportation users, and (iii) the most critical sub-transmission substations to maintain normal transportation 
sector functionality. Contrasts between co-located and potential disruptions in part depict the significant dependence placed on fuel 
supply radiating out of the countries 11 bulk distribution points. As could be expected, the critical distribution substations for 
transportation infrastructures largely correlates to population densities at  this scale. 
Through the representation of national interdependent networked infrastructures 
across New Zealand and various failure scenario simulations this project; 
• demonstrates the potential for widespread disruptions to transportation users 
and the sectors economy due to a loss in electricity, 
• identifies where redundancies in the electricity network should be focused to 
minimise these potential disruptions, and 
• highlights the differences between expert opinions and network based analysis 
for deriving system level dependency curves.  
Fig. 1. Network overviews of selected transportation and electricity infrastructures used with arrows 
indicating service flow for normal operation. 
The most critical transmission and distribution substations for normal operation of 
the transportation sector are ranked in Fig. 5 where for comparison, a simplified  
indication of direct economic losses is shown based on sectorial reductions in 
demand and corresponding industry level transactions. 
The hierarchal representation of the electricity network ensure transmission 
substations show greater disruptive potential in terms of sector disruptions and 
economic impacts. These metrics show variability based on the specific 
infrastructure networks supplied and the corresponding user dependencies. 
However, substations supplying Wellington, Christchurch, and Auckland airports 
(appearing left to right for both parts of Fig. 5) show significantly larger potential 
economic impacts and thus reliable electricity infrastructure should be of 
importance in conjunction with those with the greatest user disruption potential. 
Fig. 2. National representations of co-located transportation infrastructures, the user dependence on transportation network components, and the dependence 
placed on distribution substations based on a quartic smoothing function. 
Fig. 3. Infrastructure network user disruptions as a function of transmission ( – – ) and distribution ( — ) substation removals with corresponding upper and 









Fig. 5. Electricity distribution and transportation sector disruptions resulting from distribution and 
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COMPARISONS TO EXPERT-DERIVED CURVES 
The fuel supply - distribution electricity 
dependency curve is compared in Fig. 4 to 
the expert elicited ‘petroleum sector -
electricity sector’ relationship from the 
Economics of Resilient Infrastructure (EoRI) 
project (Buxton 2016, pers. comm.). 
Assuming analogous definitions of system 
functionality, the simulated curves of Fig. 3 
are translated to match the EoRI expert 
perceived redundancies. The approaches 
show similarities up to 80% electricity 
network inoperability. Beyond 80%, the 
EoRI curve is unchanged such that at 100% 
electricity inoperability, the effect to fuel 
supply is just below the projected 
simulation results. In comparison the median 
simulated curve suggests an increase from 
85–96% across this same period. 
Fig. 4. 
Comparisons of expert-elicited (—) and a  
translation of simulated (—)  dependencies of 
fuel supply on the electricity sector. 
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